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The Cipinang Study: Drugs and Infection in an overcrowded Indonesian Prison

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In Indonesia, a prison is a business where the majority of its merchants are fiercely competitive players. Power, Money and Pleasure organize every aspect of prison life. This is especially true in the drug prisons of the world. Indonesia’s “Narcotics Prison”, LP Cipinang, is no exception to the rule. The Cipinang correctional facility is home to 3,800 prisoners, nearly 70 percent of which are serving time for narcotics crimes. Since 2001, the high numbers of narcotics arrests in the greater Jakarta area have created an overpopulation crisis that have forced the corrections department to house most drug-related prisoners there. Although no solid figures exist, a large percentage of these prisoners were heroin heroin users or dealers. Once they were all pooled together at Cipinang, it was only a matter of time until reports of high HIV infection rates and prison deaths due to AIDS reached the public ear. Given the sudden surge of narcotics cases and the high prevalence of HIV infection among intravenous drug users, urgent and effective interventions must be designed for Indonesia’s most at-risk population, its prisoners. Whether an appropriate intervention is discovered or not, the difficult question will always be: Is Cipinang now Jakarta’s factory for HIV positive addicts or is it

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1 See, “Indonesian National Strategy for HIV/AIDS control in prisons: A public health approach for prisoners”, in International Journal of Prisoner Health, September 2006; 2 (3): 243-249. The report reads,“As reported by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights in Indonesia (MOJ, 2005a) a total of 89,000 prisoners were housed in 396 prisons in the country in April 2006. Most of these prisoners were charged for narcotics-related crimes.”

2 Ibid, page 244, “Indonesia’s Ministry of Health conducted sero-surveillance studies that resulted in the following findings:
   - Prison Kerobokan (Bali): 35 of 62 (56%) of IDU prisoners were HIV positive.
   - Prison Salemba (Jakarta): out of 250 prisoners, 22% were HIV-positive.
   - Detention house Pondok Bambu (Jakarta): out of 252 prisoners, 10.3% were HIV-positive.
In 2002, the MOH indicated that an average of 22% of prisoners in Indonesia were HIV-positive (Oppenheimer & Gunawan, 2005).”
simply one stop along a path of contagion that begins in Jakarta’s neighborhoods? This study will attempt to address this question and to describe the various sources that contribute to high rates of HIV/AIDS infection at the Cipinang prison. It will also dispel assumptions about the contained or quarantined nature of prisoners or their economies. The research is preliminary in nature and limits its focus to the Cipinang prison and not the drug cultures of Jakarta’s neighborhoods. A full analysis of the relationships between these neighborhoods and the prison is required to understand how the city’s turf-economies organize the drug trade and its relationships to prison economies. Only with such knowledge will we understand how the heroin trade organizes infection and addiction in and around developing among youth groupings.

The research below is the result of consultation with several long-term dealers, former cellblock heads, Cipinang prison guards and recently released prisoners. The research does not tabulate a sample of behaviors unique to a stratified network of imprisoned addicts. Instead, it documents the exchange economies underlying both sexual and drug-related relations between prisoners as described by long-term practitioners both within the prison and out. The reason for adopting such an approach should be obvious. The population under investigation is secretive, mobile and its behavior is not unique to prison life but informs, and is informed by, drug economies active on the outside.

The dangers of information collection for this project were surprisingly high. It appeared that several individuals working for the National Narcotics Agency (Badan Narcotics Nasional) and one particular dealer were made aware of this research. The dealer sent a message to the researcher during a meeting with an informant. Further investigations into the security risks of conducting this research were revealing. BNN (National Narcotics Body) officers acquainted with the dealer told the researcher that the dealer wanted all information regarding Indonesia’s drug trade. Apparently, this and any information regarding the drug trade serves as intelligence, or market research, for heroin syndicate leaders. Public or private information secured from BNN officers has,
according to BNN officials interviewed, been used by dealers to avoid arrest or, alternately, access expanding drug markets in areas throughout Jakarta.

The paper below was initially intended to outline the social frames for a needle exchange program that would help reduce the risk of HIV infection among Cipinang’s low-grade heroin addicts. Unfortunately, prison guards do not see in-depth research into the source of their livelihood to be beneficial to the prison. Cipinang has become a source of supplemental income to both convicts and their guards. Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, Cipinang houses several hundred addicts in need of a fix satisfied only by crack heroin or putow. Prisoner’s families and relations supply them with money. It is difficult for an institution as weak as Cipinang prison to counter such an economy single-handedly. With coordinated assistance, however, medical and security concerns can be reduced to protect prisoners from their addictions and the economies that feed them both.

Risks and Recommendations

In the present prison environment, the introduction of a needle exchange program will be perceived as an attack on narcotics networks. This is not to say that needle exchange programs are not vital to protecting the convicts, but it should be known that any attention to this economy, especially by international institutions, endangers the atmosphere of impunity enjoyed by drug dealers selling both inside and outside of prison.

The Law Enforcement Approach

- A robust and internationally supported effort should be supported to arrest the major heroin importers in Indonesia. Without such an effort on the supply side
of this economy, a needle exchange program at Cipinang will only endanger health workers and addicts.

- Research into how Indonesia’s ports are used to transport heroin should be supported by the donor community. Research and independent investigation into these supply conduits should be commissioned. Results should be shared with the National Narcotics Agency and relevant international bodies.
- Provincial BNN boards should be contacted and asked to inform a database that will link drug distribution conduits that do not fit neatly within provincial or national boundaries.

*If Efforts are Made to Reduce Heroin Sales the measurable results will be as follows:*

- Low supply will increase the price of heroin for the average addict thereby making prevention efforts and surrogate drug options (i.e. methadone) more appealing.
- With the major sellers out of the way, it will be possible to conduct mapping exercises that will show whether repeat offenders are being arrested around the same drug markets or branching out to develop others. This information will assist the health department, youth associations and law enforcement officials in their efforts to treat repeat offender addicts.

**Law Enforcement from Court to Prison**

- The caste system separating wealthy from poor prisoners must be eradicated. Money or wealthy prisoners continue to augment any and every effort made by the corrections department (Departemen Lembaga Pemasyarakatan) to isolate narcotics cases from other prisoners. Wealthy prisoners can afford nice cells on permissive blocks. On the other hand, poor prisoners are held in overcrowded
blocks where they serve as laborers to the high-class prisoners living in elite blocks.

- This relative disregard for efforts to protect prisoners from the drug trade further weakens the access-to-healthcare component of Indonesia’s judicial system.

- This effort should be coordinated and information should be shared between relevant health, security and legal bodies. A common memorandum protecting the rights of HIV positive prisoners should also be signed.

**Jail to Clinic coordination**

- Outreach programs should target communities with the highest levels of arrest and repeat offenses for heroin possession. Special efforts should be made with puskesmas or health clinics in these areas to continue treatment of former addicts or HIV positive recidivists.

- Youth organizations with bad reputations for housing thugs, addicts and petty dealers possess the best knowledge of the real life challenges faced by young offenders and addicts. The Ministry of Youth and Sport should become an active partner in the planning phase of how best to address the drug culture growing in and around Jakarta’s prisons.

**Coordination Between Departmental and Prison Bodies**

- Data collection and sharing must be conducted by all governmental bodies currently challenged by the drug economy and its negative effects upon the health, law enforcement and correctional facilities in Indonesia.
• Only through accurate and continuous data collection and monitoring will educational bodies and youth organizations be able to play a significant role in prevention and protection of Indonesia’s IDUs.

Cipinang: The Market cum Hostel

Money, and not the toughness or criminal bravado of the past, now organizes the distribution of power and pleasure at Jakarta’s Cipinang prison. It can purchase virtually everything from sentence reduction to rather exotic, but fulfilling, pleasures for its wealthier convicts. Power and pleasure also distribute the sources of risk for prisoners in search of an upgraded lifestyle. Power at Cipinang is loosely defined as the ability to manipulate the sale of goods and the distribution of favor through financial access to guards. Power provides the prisoner with personal security and access to greater monies and position on the cellblock. Therefore, a prisoner will circulate valuable commodities such as drugs to increase his wealth and, therefore, the ability to hire and control addicts, guards, external dealers and internal sellers. Risk of disease is entangled in every aspect of how injected opiates and sexual services operate in this political economy.

The Drug Economy

Putow or crack heroine is only one among many different commodities smuggled into the prison. Crack heroin, methamphetamines, marijuana, sex workers, fried bananas, barber sheers, cigarettes and cooking supplies make every prison block into a mini-market for the commerce of both illicit and tolerated goods. There is no shortage of drugs at the Cipinang prison and, if one is running short, they can be ordered by cell phone. In fact, one source said that when supply is scarce on the outside, dealers often come to the prison to place orders through dealers imprisoned there. Putow or low-grade heroine is the drug of choice at Cipinang. It is cheaper than heroin and is stirred
into water, not cooked, prior to injection. Addicted prisoners share doses, needles and provide services to other prisoners in the hope of making enough money to purchase another partial or full dose, for themselves.

The prison functions like a market but the distribution conduits of its goods are controlled and policed by the guards. The guards control distribution of everything from bananas to cigarettes to drugs. If a prisoner has money to buy goods, he must place an order with a guard. Guards are discerning merchants and often extend credit through trusted block heads but force new clients to pay cash-up-front.

**Block-heads**

Guards cannot do everything and so every prison block has a long list of goods that are purchased through hierarchically appointed figures called blockheads. Often the blockhead has enough money and credit to controls goods on his prison block. On cash poor blocks, guards sometimes fulfill the role of controlling merchant. Once delivered, drugs follow a circuitous path to its clientele. Within the block structure, for instance, a dealer will finance the core stash of drugs (heroine, putow, crystal meth, ganja) and then distribute those drugs to his *kaki-kaki* or “feet”. Feet will then inflate the price of the product sell to their clientele. The blockhead is given a share of the gross net profit while the dealer maintains loyalty among his “feet” by distributing protection, food goods and access to discounted drugs or the chance to profit from sales to poorer clients.

Internally, goods circulate between blocks, cells and prisoners. Some prisoners set up their own warungs or stalls. As in a traditional market, sellers keep abreast of market competitiveness between blocks and augment their prices or credit services accordingly. Therefore, if someone is selling goods on Blok A and the prices in Blok B turn out to be cheaper or can be purchased on credit, Blok A will lose its market. Drugs follow a similar,
although more secretive, marketing scheme. Drugs are illegal and therefore price variations are easier to sublimate through a common courtesy among dealers. *Price variations create rivalries and rivalries produce loose lips.*

Loose lips are expected within the market but even a crooked guard will get nervous if there is too much drug-related chatter splitting up groups on the block. Dealers are also aware that the loosest lips at Cipinang can be found not among convicts but with the guards. Provided their knowledge of the drug trade is limited to “turning a blind eye”, the negative impact of talkative guards can be avoided. It is easy to get drugs because the guards are available to serve as “unwitting” go-betweens. So long as they do not “know” that they are trafficking drugs, they can be bribed to bring in “instant noodle” packages. The instant noodle packages do have noodles in them but the flavor packets are five-dollar putow hits. The guards cannot be seen trafficking drugs and will always need an alibi. If guards are party to an inter-dealer rivalry, the entire trafficking mechanism is threatened. For this reason, drugs and other commodities mingle and are smuggled in common pouches through “unknowing” guards.

Once the guards and couriers are given their bribes, drug sellers and buyers are free to construct their own mini-economies. Despite the cutthroat nature of the business, some dealers even extend credit if the client is known to have access to money or economic ventures outside the prison. Credit and employment circulate capital and keep the drug economy from becoming mired in distrustful relations. If an inmate misses a payment or tries to muscle his way out of debt, the results are often painful and occasionally fatal.

In this regard, blockheads also operate like security leaders alias *preman* in markets on the outside. They normally extort money from prisoners particularly those with active economic interests on the block. Feet who sell putow, sabu sabu or ganja on a leader’s block have to make regular payments to him. Subsequently, bribes and market-related
purchases like cell phones are given to the guards, the weakest link in the chain of Cipinang’s narcotics market. Then again, the guards are no fools.

Drugs and Secrecy

In addition to the guards’ bribes for “turning a blind eye”, they regularly extort money from prisoners with secretive economies or powerful connections on the outside. Between the various guards, competition over turf or prisoner “handling” exclusivity can determine the standing of both clean and aggressively dirty guards. A squeaky-clean guard will most likely be transferred out of Cipinang if he is not willing to follow market “politesse.” According to one senior dealer and ex-convict in South Jakarta, “a guard would rather leak dirty facts about a fellow guard’s business interests than lose money to the same guard on the block.” In short, access to profit trumps meritocratic ambition.

Secrecy among fellow narcotics users is another matter altogether. Guards may leak information to superiors to free up economic interests for themselves, but narcotics users will protect their cellmates from investigation at all costs. Secrecy in Cipinang’s drug trade functions in several different ways. Rivalries between guards often compromise secret relationships resulting in the sudden transfer or silent takeover of an indiscreet guard’s position in the drug market. Because of this constant risk, dealers on the inside must work within a compartmentalized cell system (stelsel terputus) in order to protect the most vital links in the drug economy.

The compartmentalized cell system (stelsel terputus) works as follows: A dealer on the inside is the only player who is aware of all of the different actors involved in bringing drugs into the prison. Meanwhile, the external seller only knows the buyer and the guard, while the internal sellers are ignorant of the guard’s identity or the source on the outside. The guard only knows the identity of the internal buyer while drug couriers are
regularly switched to avoid the risks of personal relationships forming between guards and couriers.

How do the “feet” keep from being robbed or threatened by other addicts? If addicts threaten one of the feet, much less the dealer, that addict will be alienated and denied access to drugs. Lack of access to drugs is a fate worse than death to an addict. This sense of self inflicted slavery is most apparent among the putow addicts while the “meth heads” are less likely to sacrifice everything for their next hit.

*Generational and Class distinctions among Drug Users*

Two dealers explained the reasons for why putow addicts and meth-heads behave differently in the prison economy. It is not simply because withdrawal (sakow) from putow addiction is more painful than withdrawal from crystal meth. Rather, both men explained how the generational dynamic of Jakarta's drug consumers must be understood before other conclusions are drawn. For one, intravenous putow users are usually younger and poorer than crystal meth smokers. For this reason, some explanation of the social contexts of drug consumption is required.

Sabu-sabu or crystal meth became a very popular drug in Jakarta’s affluent urban population around 1995. Meth users said that the drug increased confidence and, according to young architects interviewed by the researcher at the time (1996-1997), users could work and focus longer after taking it.³ It was always smoked, not injected, and suggested middle-class ambition rather than the melancholic bliss of a putow addict. Putow grew during the same period but was more popular among a younger, non-professional, population of punk music fans and self-described deviants.⁴ Putow

³ The researcher interviewed young activists, academics and architects who were using sabu-sabu for the first time in 1995 Bali. They spoke of increased confidence and better concentration when they were under pressure to finish a project. Interviews were conducted for a documentary film completed in late 1997.
⁴ The punk movement was not responsible for the rise in putow consumption but it emerged as a populist rejection of standard societal norms in the late 1990’s and after Suharto’s fall. The death metal or
use was more suggestive of a remove from society than sabu-sabu which, to this day, many of its users claim improves “work effectiveness”.

Putow use also skyrocketed as punk music replaced the anti-drug death metal bands of the late New Order. The economic crisis increased distribution as hard-up shop owners were recruited to sell putow in their own communities. The steady influx of Nigerian traders and con artists to Jakarta added another layer of criminal sophistication to the mom and pop approach to putow dealing.

If one considers all of these factors, drug trafficking on the inside follows a more predictable pattern. Internal dealers contact external sellers via cell phone. In prison, almost all block mates have access to cell phones through a guard. Wealthy inmates buy guards cell phones and pulse cards. The guard then rents the phone to a seller who needs to use the phone for his business. Through the guards, external sources of drugs and internal distribution networks contrive an import-export market. Inside the block, secrecy and debt binds petty-sellers to dealers. Petty-sellers are usually addicts with knowledge of clandestine drug use from their experiences prior to arrest. Putow sellers are younger and more clandestine while wealthy convicts isolate themselves in upscale blocks where they might use designer drugs, not putow. One would think that dealers would seek out wealthier convicts because of their regular cash flow. In fact, dealers live on the rich prisoner’s blocks but are careful to separate their suburban lifestyle on the

underground movement popular during the mid-1990’s was seen by punks and activists of the period as somewhat pro-military. When asked, the leaders of these bands advocated not political but aesthetic rebellion, pure and simple. Death metal artists sacrificed rabbits on stage to “setan”. When asked why they did it they said as a sign of respect for a Swedish band that had succeeded in the inde-label market. Punks did not sacrifice themselves but rather pierced their bodies with needles and nails. Their rebellion was less aesthetic than corporeal, less middle-class than counter-cultural.

5 Interviews with Cipinang guard, April 2006. The senior guard stated that whole family economies were transformed by the sale of putow. “Formerly they sold MSG packets. Now, they sold putow and, when arrested, husband and wife were sent to separate prisons.”

6 Nigerian networks are believed to rely on international heroin distributors linking Afghanistan to Bangkok to Medan-Sumatra. From Medan-Sumatra the drugs are distributed by air, sea and land. Most dealers arrested for trafficking heroine have used this network but no detailed report of this network exists. See the training module produced by the National Narcotics Agency, Pusat Dukungan Pencegahan Pelaksana Harian Badan Narkotika Nasional, Model Pelatihan Tokoh Masyarakat Sebagai Fasilitator Penyuluh Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan Narkoba. BNN: Jakarta. 2005. pgs. 36-43.
elite blocks from the shopfloor desperation of the putow markets that support them. Dealers are equally careful in selecting their sellers on the poor or lower-middle class blocks. If one of the feet, a dirty guard or a dealer is caught, a limited number of dealers, sellers or guards will be arrested with him. How, then, did Cipinang become the drug dealer’s paradise it is today?

**Situating Cipinang’s Political Economy in Post-Suharto Indonesia**

The sudden rise in drug use and drug-related arrests radically altered the prison population and the ruling incentives that governed Cipinang’s internal economy during the late New Order (1982-1998). If we push back the clock to 1982, we are forced to reckon with an entirely different set of hegemonic state controls that governed convict-convict relations at Cipinang. The prison of the late New Order resembled Jakarta’s markets that have thrived in Jakarta over the past century and perhaps earlier. Selling rights and security in traditional markets were sub-divided according to ethnic or religious groupings. The protectors that led these groups formed gangs organized by the same ethnic and regional identities. The prison replicated the ethnic and religious corporatism of traditional markets but also differed from markets in couple of significant ways.

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7 For a good description of this period see Barker’s (1998) paper published in *Indonesia* 66: 1998 entitled, “State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto’s New Order”. Barker writes, “The Petrus killings of “criminals” began in earnest in March 1983 in the Central Javanese city of Yogyakarta and lasted for at least two years. During that time at least five thousand and perhaps more than ten thousand people deemed *bromocorah* (hoodlums), *preman* (gangsters) or *gali* (hooligans) were killed.” Hundreds of thousands of criminals were arrested as well; turning prisons into new training grounds for Indonesia’s advanced criminal populations. For more in-depth analysis of Petrus killings see David Bourchier, “Crime, Law and State Authority in Indonesia”, in *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*, ed. Arief Budiman., Clayton, Victoria: Monash University, Asia Institute, 1990.

8 Interview with senior thug leader, October 2003. According to senior preman in the field, during the late 1970’s time spent in prison was like attending a trade school in crime. The same source said that once out of jail, “we would try our luck in some of the old terminals and markets with long standing preman or thug networks such as Pasar Senen, Cililitan, Blok M and Tanah Abang”. These terminal and market areas became notorious for the “cadreization” of preman thugs in need of employment in the security sector. In these markets new recruits from the outer regions would compete with ex-cons fresh out of prison.
For one, during the New Order (1967-1998), prisoners at Cipinang were subject to security institutions organized at once vertically (segregation by crime)) and horizontally (block segregation according to primordial identity). New Order prison blocks were divided up according to offenses against the State, Society or Law. For instance, convicts imprisoned for dealing in narcotics, political subversion or murder were segregated and subject to review by different legal and security bodies. In addition to these distinctions, convicts organized themselves according to ethnicity and religion; a practice conventional to criminal networks operating in Jakarta’s markets and entertainment districts. These primordial networks were not sui generis distinctions discovered by criminals on the inside, however but reflected the gang structures growing and supporting criminality in urban Indonesia. For instance, Ambonese, West Sumatrans, Bataks and Javanese were referred to according to their gang names on the outside.

These various conglomerate identities created internal cohesion among separate prison groups and empowered weaker prisoners against the stronger. Conflicts were avoided in ways similar to the methods used by rival gang leaders on the outside. There was a delicate balance to be maintained at New Order Cipinang but muscle, the threat of violence, and identity served to protect prisoners from each other and the threats posed by destabilizing commodities such as drugs. In this sense, regardless of the sudden upsurge in wealth experienced by one group due to drug money, the social capital of each grouping-ethnic identity, linguistic solidarity, religious practice-created stability where market forces and State procedure ruled supreme. Equipped with these

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10 Wilson (2005) described these groups in some detail. The groups he describes are, however, the key gangs responsible for running Jakarta’s thug elements until 2002. He listed them as “Arek” (Javanese gangs), Kelompok Tanjung Priok (Primarily Bugis or Makassar led groups from North Jakarta), Kelompok “Famili 23” or the 23 Family. The 23 family consisted of narcotics dealers who bought their way into power. The Kelompok “Korea” or Korean group referred to ethnic Batak leaders from Northern Sumatra. There were other criminal groupings from Palembang, Papua and Ambon. There were also “White Collar” criminal groupings that, like the 23 Family, purchased security and comfort with money and not muscle.
resources, leaders were able to accumulate money and power within the broader constellation of Cipinang’s leaders and gangs. In return, prisoners paid dues or services to their leaders. Leaders sustained authority through muscle, relationships with guards, toughs and the circulation of goods through allies and primordially defined peers.

After 2001, when Abdurahman Wahid was impeached and the politically driven system of New Order control had eroded, Cipinang prison transformed in several important ways. The most noticeable difference was the sudden lack of the national prison system to categorize prisoners according to crimes committed. While in the past, drug dealers and political prisoners were separated and controlled by different branches of the security forces, since 2001 convicts guilty of every imaginable crime are mixed together. The second difference during the same period was the erasure of the ethnic and gang-style corporatism which characterized the previous century at Cipinang. Among the causes for this erasure was, according to one senior Cipinang guard, the increased detention of wealthy criminals. Beginning in 2002, high profile criminals such as Tomy Suharto and Bob Hassan arrived with huge resources capable of transforming cells into hotel rooms. The already market sensitive rules of Cipinang prison “corrected” to accommodate these new “guests”, a development not lost upon opportunistic narcotics sellers arrested during the same period. Even under Suharto, there were elite blocks at Cipinang. Nevertheless, the wholesale refurbishment of cells was unknown until the high profile cases of Abdurahman Wahid’s presidency began to enter the prison.

Cipinang’s once streetwise and capital poor gang structure has since transformed to restructure the physical distribution of space to the detriment of the collectivist protection networks that once protected the weak from the strong. Today’s Cipinang is divided between several grades of “have’s” and “have-nots”. Consumptive elites have replaced the relatively leveled (muscle leveled class) corporate gang networks. In short, the both the guards and the poor blocks depend upon the wealth and authority of the
rich blocks. How did such a service sector emerge so quickly after nearly a century of muscle driven cell culture?

The reform movement created an independent police force in 1999 and a relatively independent judiciary by 2001. This did not change the fact that wealthy convicts required tiled floors, television sets, air conditioning, catered meals, access to cell phones and many other accoutrements previously unheard of at Cipinang. They also needed to reduce their sentences as quickly as possible and to secure relationships with prison guards and authorities. These men did not want to get “schooling” at Cipinang. They wanted to return to their private sector cellblocks on the outside. In the meantime, new service providers emerged to design the way “bosses” would be treated at the prison. The only way to create a service oriented block structure was for white-collar criminals to become block heads. Block heads received twice the normal convict’s sentence remissions in return for their leadership. As one might imagine, high profile criminals quickly bought up the block head positions, appointed their own cell room heads and organized a new system of patronage and block management. They succeeded in reducing their sentences, inflating the cost of block and cell head appointments, and managing the circulation of high-quality goods through their guards, their protection and their authority.

The Cipinang prison no longer functioned like a Jakarta market, complete with multi-ethnic assemblage of quasi-autonomous groupings. Instead, it was managed by a set of purely self-interested and wealthy men. Where patrimonial ties once instilled a sense of respect for seniority and cadreization (between senior convicts and new ones), the post-Suharto dynamic was managed by money first with power as its secondary by-product. Why did Cipinang change so dramatically or, perhaps more appropriately, how did legal, economic and political shifts on the outside effect Cipinang on the inside?
What is a prison if it is not a reflection of how a society views the power of punishment? Indonesian politics changed overnight when Suharto stepped down in 1998, most especially in Jakarta. Internal migration of Indonesia’s poor to the nation’s capital placed pressures on the city unlike any other time in its history. The monetary crisis, the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime and an upsurge in prostitution and entertainment ventures empowered everyday citizens to participate in illegal activities hitherto controlled by the powerful, or connected, elite.  

Narcotics networks were significant during the mid-1990’s but were not as sophisticated as the syndicates operating now. Suharto’s form of authoritarian surveillance also made it easier to control the drug trade prior to 1999. After the police were separated from the military in April 1999 and, in 2001, narcotics offenses were made into a national priority and over seventy percent of Jakarta’s prisons were incarcerated for narcotics offenses. Under the burden of the sudden upsurge in narcotics related crimes and arrests, police and provincial authorities decided to make the Cipinang prison into the primary holding area for all narcotics offenses. The flexibility of the new “gang-less” social network of Cipinang was the perfect environment for narcotics networks to grow and perpetuate themselves. The guards had established a neat set of relatively contained businesses for the sake of the rich, the most important component of which was the steady influx of forbidden produce from the outside.  

A new development that helped to increase narcotics commerce in both Cipinang and on the outside, was the influx of Nigerian heroin sellers to Indonesia. Drugs were not the only commodity being trafficked by Nigerian criminal networks. They also purchased

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11 The development of the drug trade during the 1990’s was exceptionally well organized. A totally new network of post-cold war dealers emerged to fill a market niche. Hopefully, leaders knowledgeable of these new networks will write a study when it becomes safe to do so.

13 This information should not be new to Indonesian law enforcement officials. Cipinang guards have been criticized by the media for their involvement in narcotics rackets, smuggling and criminal permissiveness towards wealthy criminals. In February 2003, for instance, LP Cipinang guards were found with large stashes of methamphetamine, putow heroine, a press for making crystal meth packets and a scale. See Kompas article, Pegawai LP Cipinang Diduga Terlibat Jaringan Narkoba, 13 Februari 2003. Pegawai LP
and exported large amounts of factory rejects to countries in both Asia and Africa. Their relationships with customs, immigration and prison officials facilitated smuggling and network building in Jakarta at a pace unrivalled by any other social group in the city. Despite their connections, over the past seven years, Nigerians also account for the majority of foreigners arrested for dealing heroin in several of Jakarta’s hot zones such as Tanah Abang-Central Jakarta, an area now notorious for having the highest concentration of HIV positive heroin addicts in the country.

The Nigerian contingent at Cipinang employs a sophisticated system of insider trading with guards and external dealers to make sure that they continue to earn a profit in prison. According to one source, who was arrested for dealing in sabu-sabu, Nigerian networks rely upon Nigerian-exclusive funding and drug conduits. The supply source for the actual heroin or putow is not known. Nevertheless, Nigerians place orders with friends in Jakarta who then send a courier with the drugs to Cipinang. These same Nigerian dealers also coordinate drug deals on the outside. If drugs are scarce due to drug busts or new supply lines, dealers on the outside either call or meet with the Nigerians at Cipinang to arrange for drug purchases. The Nigerian in Cipinang will contact a third party who will be told to pass goods to the dealer.

Catered Punishments: Elite vs. Block Cells

Nigerians, corrupt officials, narcotics dealers or anyone with enough disposable income to burn will most likely try to find their way into an elite cell after they become a prisoner at Cipinang. When a rich prisoner is admitted to Cipinang, he will be assigned a cell. Shortly after his place is assigned, a guard will ask him, “do you want a more comfortable spot?” For a semi-elite location in one of the comfortable blocks, a prisoner will pay a minimum of 5 million rupiah.14 Catered meals cost 3-500,000 rupiah per week.

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14 Now, according to a senior guard, Cipinang will not be described in terms of blocks but as lingkungan or environs. For example, There are two linkungan or overall neighborhoods within the prison. Linkungan I and II:
(35-55 US dollars per week). Only three to five prisoners inhabit a cell on elite blocks. In special cases, such as that of Tommy Suharto, elite cells can house as few as one prisoner. The guards also arrange for poor prisoners to wash the floors, do the laundry and shine the shoes of the wealthier convicts. The foreign criminals tend to be placed in the elite 4H block. Meanwhile, corrupt officials or businessmen are held in 3H. Each of the cells on these blocks holds 3-4 prisoners and the blocks themselves house 12 rooms each. Television sets are rented to room tenants at 80,000 rupiah per week or month depending on demand. The next level of rooms is categorized as middle-elite. The floors are not tiled but the bathroom in these cells are clean and the number of men per cell wavers around 3-5 depending on the number of tenants. A prisoner must pay between 1.5 to 3 million rupiah to gain access to a bed in one of these cells. Blocks 3-F and 3-E are categorized as middle-elite cells and generally house the children of wealthy families, particularly if the inmate is to serve a long sentence (see Map Appendix).

Guards control the human traffic between the elite and poor blocks. High profile inmates are given special access with inflated prices for each of the requested services. As described above, the cell maids of each of the elite cells are recruited from poor blocks and maintained by the guards. Poor inmates must carry letters of permission to move freely between elite and poor blocks while elite convicts need no such letters.

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Lingkungan I:
II F: 2 people
IIA: 5 men
IIB: 15 men
II: C 2 men
II D: 2 men

Lingkung II:
II A; semi-elite housing 3-5 prisoners
II F: semi-elite housing 3-5 prisoners.

For the meantime, the elite will be placed in II. The elite cells have been refurbished largely because they once housed high-profile cases.
The poor inmates have reason to want to take these jobs. Outside of the obvious desire for good food, hand outs and cash payments, they also can breathe cleaner air. The poor blocks such as D,A, BT and C house 21 to 19 cells per block with inmate density ranging between 20 and 45 convicts per room. The bathrooms are filthy and consist of little more than a constantly flowing water pipe and a basin. The head of the rooms are called Palkam and they operate through muscle, extortion and the regular use of violence. Putow or crack heroine is king on the poor blocks and there is little the prison's guard structure can do to stop it. The only thing that keeps the poor block inmates from overdosing more regularly is their relative poverty. Sexually transmitted diseases are less common among putow users. Perhaps a positive side affect of putow addicts is that their libidos hibernate throughout the addiction. Unless they are prostituting themselves to buy a hit, they do not suffer from the same pangs of desire experienced by other prisoners.

Even though the majority of young, tough, putow users are in the poorer blocks, regular users and buyers can be found on the elite Block III, especially 3I and 3F. Although the inmates on this block are more likely to use chrystal meth, they also consume heroine and, if it is not available, putow. The impact on HIV infection is considerable for putow and sabu-sabu users living on Blok III. While putow users share HIV when they share needles, sabu-sabu users contract the disease through increased sexual relations due to their radically enhanced libido. Elite blocks take advantage of their access to money and regularly send the guards to bring sex workers to the prisons to satisfy their sexual desires.

Husbanding Domesticity at Cipinang

In addition to “ordering out” for sexual favors, less powerful prisoners perform paid sexual or “domestic” favors to the wealthier inmates. Cipinang, as in many of Indonesia’s prisons, is host to a number of exclusive, sometimes multi-partnered,
domestic arrangements where less powerful inmates become the mock wives (bini-binian) of more powerful or wealthier prisoners. As bini-binian, poorer prisoners perform domestic chores that an Indonesian husband might expect of a subservient wife. House-cleaning, clothes washing, massages, shoe shines and sexual favors are all expected of a bini-binian. In return, the “wife” receives access to the drugs, money, food and security of the more powerful “husband”. The sharing of needles among putow addicts and bini-binian domestic arrangements are the key sources of HIV infection among Cipinang prisoners. Knowledge of the shifting horizons of domesticity in Cipinang is crucial to understanding both the prison’s political economy and the non-IV drug sources of HIV infection.

Throughout Cipinang’s elite cells, one will find “husband-wife” relations between an elite cell resident and a younger, and usually poorer, “wife”. Cipinang prisoners used to call the relationship between a more powerful convict and a weaker prisoner, ade-adean or “mock brothers”.15 “Ade-adean” was a more appropriate term in the New Order days when physical or thuggish power determined the power differential in same-sex relationships between weaker, but not necessarily poorer, prison relations. Therefore, fraternal, and not domesticated, relations between a more dominant protector and a weaker “sibling” characterized erotic tensions between same sex, yet heterosexual, partners of those years.

After 2001, when an increasingly large number of narcotics and white-collar crimes were tried and sentenced in court, a new class of criminals entered the prison. These men were not renowned for their muscle but for their money. Their desires and sense of well-being were less predatory than sedentary. They required a home, a wife and a television. This is when same-sex relations were coined “bini-binian” or “mock wives” as mentioned above. Sexual relations were not as predominant in bini-binian relations. The most important distinction between New Order style Ade-Adean and post-Suharto Bini-

Binian relations is that, in the bini-binian relations of the present, the “husband” is no longer the protector but the provider. The “wife” is no longer a younger brother in search of protection but he has become a demure, consumptive and sedentary wife in search of pleasure, favor and gifts.

In the bini-binian situation, husbands provided for all of their wives’ needs. Drugs, clothes and food were available provided the wife remained monogamous. Loyalty, according to three sources, has always been an issue. One long-term narcotics convict stated that he witnessed the serial seduction of several “sexy” wives of corrupt officials by more politically powerful narcotics leaders on the same block.

Domestic arrangements are not always so peaceful. Down on the block, far from the watchful eye of doting guards or protective husbands, wives or weaker males are regularly gang-raped and forced into a submissive relationship by block males. According to one source, “if an unusually girlish or pale male is placed on the block, he is bound to be made someone’s wife. If his husband is rich but lacks connections, a thug from the block may take over his wife, especially if her position with the husband is more physical in nature.”16 The husband-wife pairs fear such a forced elopement and will stay in their cells and not even venture into other parts of their relatively safe elite block. If the wife is an addict, she will insist on her share of the husband’s drugs or even force him to purchase drugs for “her”.

The ade-adean cum bini-binian practice became more commonplace after 1993, when conjugal visits were outlawed. Eddy Tansil, a famously corrupt businessman detained at Cipinang at the time, used a conjugal visit to escape from prison.17 Prisoners at Cipinang were punished for Tansil’s successful escape and were denied conjugal visits or monthly physical relations with their wives as a result. Whether conjugal visits were permitted or

16 Interview with senior drug dealer who spent five years at Cipinang for drug dealing offenses.
not, Cipinang has always been libidinous. The absence of conjugal visits simply
intensified the need to husband those desires through “mock” wives. Bini-binian
arrangements are relatively normal in Cipinang because they can be disguised as guard
facilitated cleaning services. Nevertheless, other prisoners are alert to changes in
behavior when a “couple” becomes especially domesticated. The couple tends not to
leave their cell for fear of being subject to the jeering of their block mates. Elite prison
blocks have improved considerably forcing even more poor block inmates to service the
needs of the monied elite in the prison. The increase in long-term elite prisoners
capable of bringing large amounts of disposable cash to the prison was largely due to
the increased arrest of narcotics dealers and corrupt Indonesian officials (all of whom
serve long sentences).

Unfortunately, no reliable figures exist that would tell us how many prisoners were HIV
positive when they entered Cipinang as compared to those infected within its walls. In
lieu of concrete statistical data, which may or may not tell us how to track the habits of
such a secretive set of drug-related practices, interviews with recidivist prisoners were
especially helpful in gaining a knowledge of transformation in Cipinang’s drug economy
over the past decade.

Wither Reform: From Policed Punishment to free-market Correctional Formats

The changes in Cipinang’s form of prisoner placement contributes to the
commoditization of elite cells against the jungle of poor block overcrowding. Why the
sudden mixing of criminals guilty of serious crimes with petty offenders? Reform in an
Indonesian idiom might be the answer. The logic of the previous penitentiary system
under Suharto was clear. Political activists were not allowed to consort with “skilled”
criminals, as it was feared that these radically different social groupings would
contaminate each other and, henceforth, mutate to create a new form of criminally
informed political activism. The most dangerous “contagion” of the New Order era was
political. The body politic, not the biological citizen, posed the greatest danger to Suharto’s state.

To say that elite blocks did not exist during the New Order would be misleading. Elite blocks did exist but more as a by-product of the offense committed than as the primary organizational feature of the prison. For example, under Suharto political activists were primarily from the middle-class while low-level criminals were often poor members of larger criminal networks. Leaders within criminal networks had contacts and were able to negotiate their way out of doing time. Criminals who ended up serving time at Cipinang either lacked these connections or had committed crimes of necessity without a backup plan. Therefore, even though Suharto’s Cipinang prison system separated the “subversive” from the “criminal”, this distinction also indirectly separated the middle from the lower classes in the prisons. Now money, not violations, determines the prisoner’s position in elite or low class blocks. No middle class activists or revolutionaries currently reside at Cipinang. The anti-subversion laws that once detained them were rendered obsolete and they were granted amnesty. The state no longer punished and monitored criminals. For lack of a new, non-authoritarian, ethos, Cipinang now has a simple economic logic. Individuals are no longer celebrities, the cellblocks were. If any prisoner has enough money, a bed in one of the elite blocks is for the taking. It is, without grandstanding, a perfect example of capitalism democracy at work.

Now, the days of tough thugs or preman are over. No matter how tough the petty criminals or small time offender, he will lack the means to seek a position within the pecking order of cell block leaders (voorman) or cell heads (kepala kamar). For lack of outside funding, minor operators are forced to fend for themselves in the low class

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18 The term “preman” refers to three different kinds of people: 1) Gang members who guard, protect, extort or fight as free-lance thugs; or 2) plainclothes policemen or military in their off-duty “civvies” or undercover; 3) Preman also refers to former free-lance thugs who have been recruited to work for the military and police as salaried informants or semi-official intelligence or security guards. For a more in-depth study of preman see, Ryter, Loren, “Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto’s Order?” *Indonesia* 68 (October 1998): 64-65.
blocks. Their sentences are short and, according to two former long-term prisoners, they are more prone to seek quick fix solutions to their short-term problems. The smarter among them set up small businesses where they sell fried bananas, cigarettes and provide haircuts, shaves and shoeshines to more well to do inmates. Inmates with some experience with narcotics will most likely attempt to be hired as the “feet” or minor peddlers of a wealthy or syndicated dealer.

The length of a prisoner’s sentence remains an indicator of his relative poverty to other prisoners at Cipinang. Petty offenders with little surplus cash rarely have the means to bribe officials to reduce their sentences or avoid sentencing altogether. Despite the above rule of thumb, since 2001, the length of a prisoner’s term did not necessarily determine the style of his prison cell. Political prisoners, poor or rich, were held in the same cells and did not relocate when they came into money or misfortune. Now, even short-term prisoners with access to money can buy their way into a nice cell with catered meals, tile floors, a television set, maid services and, more recently, air conditioning. Even though the justice system no longer separates prisoners according to their crimes, the relative wealth of convicts has effectively overhauled the distribution of power, pleasure and risk at Cipinang.

The Political Class Structure of Cipinang

Despite the money-oriented nature of Cipinang’s system, a trustee-guard-warden structure orders the day-to-day functioning of the prison. Cipinang’s structure is hierarchical and the block-heads or Voorman possess real authority over other prisoners. There are 18 blocks at the Cipinang prison. Each block is headed by a Voorman and all Voorman are subject to the directives of a head Forman or “Forman Star”. Why go to the trouble of becoming a Voorman or trustee of the guards? Every religious holiday, independence day, prisoners receive 1 month remission on their sentences. Block heads or Voorman receive twice the normal remission time for
holidays and voorman status. Voorman or cell heads can count on a minimum of six months being cut off their sentences for every year they are chosen to fill those positions. It is crucial, therefore, for powerful leaders with long sentences to be made Voorman for as long as possible. Once an individual is made Voorman, he can organize the socio-economic activities of the block to suit his needs and those of his block-based backers (including the guards who recommended his appointment). Today all of this is made possible through bribes and economic prowess. This was not the case prior to 2001.

The key today is to secure the support of the Head Guard (Pastel, Petugas Tingkat I) through bribery. After the Pastel has confirmed a Voorman’s nomination, further bribes and signs of respect must be paid to the warden’s deputy (KPLP or Ketua Pelaksanaan Lembaga Pemasyarakatan). The KPLP is the immediate subordinate of the warden (Kalapas) and his recommendation for Voorman are usually excepted without question. The KPLP therefore determines the hierarchies of the prison until the next Voorman or block head are selected. It is not clear whether bribes are given all the way to level of warden, but Voorman appointments are purchased, not earned. Economic superiority on the elite blocks is, therefore, more the result of purchased favor than physical retribution. Cipinang’s majority population of dealers and addicts supports this system through a set of clear needs, expectations and incentives.

Cipinang’s Population: Industry, Addiction and Patronage

Men who are serving sentences for 10-15 years will always try to keep busy. The fact that they are in jail for the long time effects the kind of decisions they will make. According to one senior prisoner released in 2001, the older criminals are less likely to use IV drugs if they are not already addicted when they are sent to Cipinang. They might
use crystal-meth (*sabu-sabu*) or marijuana if they need a boost or a come down. Age also plays a role in deciding which drugs prisoners are willing to use. Those who came to know *sabu-sabu* when it was cheap and available in the mid-1990’s, will most likely stay with the drugs they knew when they were younger. The young inmates, under 35, are more likely to choose putow, a drug which rose to prominence just prior to Suharto’s resignation in 1998.

Young and old inmates alike rely upon family to bring donations and to finance their addictions. The younger, poor petty violators are not likely to get many visits during their 9 month sentence. They live on the “(poor) Block” and, because of their low social standing and poor finances; they will be forced to find safety in numbers. Given their age, social standing and offenses, they will choose putow over crystal meth or marijuana. No single member of a young and poor Blok grouping will be able to afford a single putow hit (1 gram costs 1,200,000), but if all of them pitch in (*patungan*) they can each get high (50,000 rupiah hits do exist but do not fulfill the thirst of an addict). The share (*patungan*) or five-on-a-needle system in the larger blocks requires that more prisoners use the same needles to bid on hits shared in common. The secretive nature of their “hit”, particularly if they are poor prisoners with several creditors, will keep them from seeking out a clean needle unless they are already wary of the dangers of HIV.

*Access to Needles*

The access to clean, new needles at Cipinang is nearly non-existent. Diabetics are allowed access to needles that they must purchase from the health clinic there. Diabetics then make a business out of their needles and distribute them to the needle-poor addicts in their midst. It is for this reason that addicts at Cipinang refer to syringes not as needles but as “insul” or “insulin”. In fact, the term for finding a vein for proper putow injection is called “being doctored” or *didokterin*. Many of the prisoners fake a
diabetic condition and make requests for needles but the needle stock is low and they can rarely be used more than three or four times.

Access to alcohol or other cleansing agents is equally rare at Cipinang. Nevertheless, white cooking vinegar is available which, if used to flush and soak a syringe for a sufficiently long period, can kill blood transmitted viruses harbored in the needle or tube of the syringe. Until now, no effort has been made to create sufficiently “discreet” forms of needle sterilization. Why should a needle exchange program be discreet? The problem with creating a needle exchange program is that, unless the clinic is in charge of their distribution and disposal, the documentation of needle use will be tantamount to investigation of IV drug use at Cipinang.

The very real danger is that prisoners will not seek out clean needles if syringes are charged with legal or internal political risk. The secondary risk is that prisoners who seek out clean needles will be ostracized by other inmates or prevented from accessing sterile needles. The final risk is the disruption of social relations in Cipinang. The drug economy currently brings large amounts of money to Cipinang prison. Economic discrepancies between the wealthy and the poor are overcome through master/servant relations between elite block employers and poor inmates living in the sardine packed blocks. This economy maintains social order in a prison system poorly equipped to provide the necessary food or care to an overcrowded and under funded prison. In short, Cipinang’s free-market economy exists, in part, because the prison cannot function without it. Protectionist programs such as needle exchange might be possible but would run counter to every other form of exchange operating at the prison. In short, needle exchange should be accompanied by several other forms of health-related programs that would make needle exchange into a part of a health program designed to make the prisoner into clinical, and not purely economic, agents.

_HIV Related Ostricism_
Such a health program would help to assist prisoners currently ostracized by their blocks. Prisoners know what happens to fellow prisoners known to suffer from HIV. The father of an addict who died of AIDS due to needle sharing outside and inside Cipinang, explained to the researcher how prisoners are treated once it is known that they are infected. Each of the prisoners suspected to be suffering from HIV related illnesses or AIDS is alienated and treated as a pariah on both budget and elite blocks. After being ostracized, they are sent to the prison clinic. In the case of the father’s son above, the patient was a pariah to his blockmates and was forced to fend for himself without drugs, food or supplemental income. At the prison clinic, HIV positive prisoners will receive some preliminary treatment free of charge but, soon thereafter, they or their families are forced to pay the bill. If the prison hospital can no longer treat the prisoner, he will be sent to the police hospital in Kramatjati. At both the prison hospital and Kramatjati, the prisoner’s family must shoulder the expense of treatment. If he cannot pay the hospital bill, the prisoner will die or be turned away without treatment.

There may be some improvement in the treatment of prisoners after the new division of the prison is finished. Currently, a new narcotics wing has been built. Nevertheless, not all narcotics offenses have been relocated to the new block. The problem being that some of the nicest cells are in the new Narcotics wing and, until the paper work and relocation procedures are finalized, wealthy prisoners will have access to the new cells. Each cell is equipped with a shower and a varnished cement floor. The new narcotics prison is the first of two other buildings that will be built to accommodate all of Cipinang’s prisoners. In this way, it will be harder to isolate poorer prisoners from rich. Until this new system is implemented, however, the Narcotics wing is simply a new subdivision capable of housing Cipinang’s highest paying convicts.

*The Accursed Share: Binding Relations through Drugs*
The above description of how dealers manipulate increasingly loose surveillance at Cipinang does help to explain how drugs enter Cipinang but not how they are consumed. Drugs are expensive and, regardless of how much money an average addict has, his desire for money is not as great as his desire for drugs. This does not create a supply problem for the dealers but it does effect the capacity for addicts to “share” their hit. The pressure to share and develop debtor-creditor ties is considerable at Cipinang. Debtor ties create bonds of loyalty and can be seen as forms of prisoner-to-prisoner investment in future sharing opportunities. This also means that, where an addict might just smoke his putow hit on the outside, thereby avoiding the dangers of overdose or infection, at Cipinang he will be made to divide his hit into miniscule doses consumed by fellow prisoners to forestall withdrawal (sakow).

The problem with putow consumption among the non-elite prison population is that younger, short-sentenced, prisoners use drugs as a means to bind relations and maintain cash flow. Wealthier, elite, prisoners will not use drugs in quite the same way. If an elite prisoner receives a good hit, he will give his cell-mates a sample of his hit but will not affix a price to the favor. One experienced Cipinang dealers explained, “In such a way, elite prisoners express their prestige to each other and invest in similar, in-kind, gifts from their peers.” Although elite prisoners are more likely to use heroin than the cheaper putow, injection is less an economic necessity than an effort to maximize the effect of the drug. Poorer prisoners on the “block” will pitch in to buy a hit or, more likely, wait for a friend to buy a hit and then divide it up into five-dollar bits (50,000 raps). This is done quickly and only after the drug is in front of them and ready to be consumed.

Three to five addicts can wager to pitch in to pay for a share of a single prisoner’s hit. Others may demand a share without cash and be indebted to one or two of the shareholders. There will undoubtedly only be one needle or “insul” for all of the shareholders. They will all mix the putow and inject it as the others wait for their chance
at the needle and the putow hit. These kinds of relation rich, needle-poor, situations are the primary source of HIV infection among prisoners at Cipinang. Even though most of the addicts are long time users accustomed to the five shares to a needle, the atmosphere at Cipinang does not provide an exit strategy for prisoners wary of the danger of needle sharing.

The Porousness of the Drug Trade and HIV infection at Cipinang

Perhaps one of the most difficult aspects of preventing the spread of HIV at Cipinang is the fact that the IV drug users are not first time users and are accustomed to sharing needles. In fact, most of the IV drug users in Jakarta have shared needles with addicts or dealers. The presence of a needle exchange program in Cipinang would undoubtedly help prevent new infections but it is important to be realistic of the porous quality of contagion at Cipinang.

Secondly, there is an element of regional recycling. Meaning, residents of areas known to have high HIV rates due to the heroin trade make up the majority of the narcotics related convicts at Cipinang. The convicts continue to use drugs at Cipinang and rely upon familiar narcotics networks to acquire them. The rules of the trade on the inside are similar to those that operate in their own neighborhoods. The only difference is that their ability to steal, cheat or take criminal short cuts to purchase their next hit is severely reduced in prison. Trust among addicts is hard to come by outside of prison but it is the key to survival on the inside. Treachery is, according to a narcotics leader and former cell block head, the quickest way to an early grave at Cipinang.

The statistical or even analytic challenge posed by the reality described above is that it is hard to get Cipinang specific data regarding infection rates. Unless the convict in question never used IV drugs or only smoked putow on the outside and scarcity has
forced the addict to inject putow in prison, it is unlikely that needle-use behavior on the outside will differ from the situation in prison.

Meanwhile, non-IV drug users are in danger of contracting HIV from unprotected sex with other men or from sex workers smuggled into the prison. Unprotected anal sex between men and transactions with on-call sex workers working on the train tracks behind Cipinang are about as risk-free as five-on-a-needle putow parties. Bini-binian patronage remains a key way for poorer young men on poor blocks to secure favorable living conditions from elite block men. The likelihood of this occurring depends on the financial situation of the convict. As described above, attractive men on the poor block (blok abal-abal) will seek out a patron in the elite groupings.

Previous forms of patronage during the Suharto days did not necessarily include a transactional relationship. Ethnicity, religion or other binding factors were enough to protect a weaker male from a more powerful or libidinous suitor. Today, gang or primordial entities have succumbed to less forgiving, and decidedly transactional, ties. Anal sex is one sex transactional practice required to secure favor from an elite block patron or “husband”. There is almost no condom use at Cipinang and, if two men are caught having sex, the prison punishes them with two weeks solitary confinement. To a prisoner, the dangers of unprotected anal sex are not as great as the stigmas attributed to the practice itself. Despite the risks of disease and the harmless nature of rubber prophylactics (unlike needles), prison authorities continue to deny convicts access to free condoms.

The Narcotics Suites: More of the Same?

One of the measures the prison has taken to make sure that narcotic cases are separated from the general prison population is the construction of a narcotics wing. In reaction to this desperate need that special attention is paid to narcotics-related cases,
a narcotics wing was built and made partially functional in 2002. Four floors of new cells are committed to narcotics offenders and these new cells are constructed after an international model. These more “humane” cells house four to five prisoners and are complete with proper showers and toilet facilities. Unfortunately, narcotics offenders are not guaranteed access to these cells.

Instead, prisoners such as Tommy Suharto and Rahardi Ramelan are housed in these cells. Corrupt officials pay dearly to gain access to this sparsely populated wing and its high-class tenants. Ironically, narcotics offenders without a steady stream of money will not earn a cell in this wing. Most poor narcotics offenders continue to be placed in the poor blocks (Blok abel abel; Blok A, B, C, D). Even middle class offenders may not be able to afford access to the new narcotics wing. For instance, television celebrity, Roy Martin, was imprisoned for possession of crystal meth but was placed in Blok 2F, a semi-elite block without catering, individual televisions or AC. Meanwhile, high paying offenders install air conditioning units, televisions and ceramic floor tiles in the already international standard narcotics wing.

The political structure of the new wing also differs quite radically from the Cipinang we have come to know. There are no cellblock leaders or cell heads in the new wing. All security and social activities are monitored and controlled exclusively by cell guards. Cells are not organized into blocks but by environs (lingkungan) and wings. As described above, the idealistic correctional system designed to separate narcotics offenders from the rest of the population has already failed. Money and the desire for more comfortable cells conquered the international standards before they were even implemented. Guards, and not cellblock leaders, must bear the burden (and reap the profits) in this new system.

Despite these failures and obstacles, before the end of 2006, prison authorities have stated that the entire Cipinang population will be housed in the new wings and cells
currently under construction. There will no longer be accounts of forty-five men to a
poor block cell. Nevertheless, even senior Cipinang guards explained that the elite-poor
distinction would continue to order the treatment of prisoners. High-value prisoners
demand high value treatment, and a certain degree of domesticity. Why? As General
Wiranto put it in a recent television interview, “The government wouldn’t dare arrest
“important” people during the New Order. Look at the situation now? Important citizens
are sent to jail every day.” Wiranto’s dismay at the state of law and order in today’s
Indonesia may be a sign that things are improving.

Nevertheless, it does not help us to figure out the best way to prevent HIV/AIDS from
becoming endemic to Indonesia’s drug trade, heroin addicts and their sexual partners in
prison. As I have described above, incarceration and education merely address and
(often worsen) the symptom of the problem without addressing its causes. Strong and
political efforts must be made to isolate and eradicate the high-level dealers responsible
for bringing heroin into this country. These lead dealers do exist and are heavily
protected. Nevertheless, at no time in Indonesia’s short history has it possessed such a
law-abiding president and police chief. The Vice President, Jusuf Kala, is also a strong
supporter of any effort made to reduce HIV/AIDS. Indonesia is a post-authoritarian
nation with all of the authoritarian hardware intact. Oddly, this may be Indonesia’s most
redeeming feature where law enforcement and counter-narcotics strategies are
concerned. It is well known that the country’s best detectives are in anti-narcotics
divisions. Unfortunately, these detectives are regularly outsourced to assist counter-
terrorism investigations. The success of their work has resulted in increasing demands
upon their time while heroin is gaining an every stronger foothold in Indonesia’s urban
communities. Indonesian citizens know who these powerful dealers are and yet without
strong political commitments to counter them, very little can be done. Sadly, needle
exchange programs cannot succeed so long as prison guards and counter-narcotics
officials wish to keep HIV/AIDS a public secret.