Notes

[1] Allison R. Michael & Scott M. Lidman, Monitoring of Employees Still Growing, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B9. 

[2] See Thomas R. Greenberg, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 219, 249-50 (1994); Jarrod J. White, E-Mail-Work.Com/Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1103-04 (1997).

[3] Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 78. 

[4] Id. at 78.

[5] Alexander I. Rodriguez, All Bark, No Byte: Employee E-mail Privacy Rights in the Private Sector Workplace, 47 EMORY L.J. 1439, 1467 (1998).

[6] Id. at 1472 (giving examples - Professor Lawrence Tribe's proposed Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the Constitution protecting privacy rights, creating statutory presumption against the waiver of right to privacy in order to shift the current reasonableness balancing test between employee expectations and business interests in favor of privacy interests, etc.). 

[7] See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 

[8] Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1998).

[9] Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555). 

[10] See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1998); S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. 

[11] See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1998) (adding "electronic" communications). 

[12] See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1998). See also Alexander I. Rodriguez, All Bark, No Byte: Employee E-mail Privacy Rights in the Private Sector Workplace, 47 EMORY L.J. 1439, 1449 n.56 (1998) (arguing that legislative history reveals that Congress intended the ECPA to extend protection to private telephone networks, not just common carriers). 

[13] See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1998) ( The Wiretap Act provides a civil cause of action against "any person who - (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communications"). 

[14] See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1998) (The Stored Communications Act establishes civil liability of one who:

"(1)intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or

(2)intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such

system... . . ."). 

[15] See, e.g. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998)); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001) (calling the ECPA the "statutory thicket"). 

[16] Gandy, supra note 3, at 106.

[17] See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1998).

[18] See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1998).

[19] Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

[20] Id. at 28, 33.

[21] Bochan v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996). 

[22] Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (arguing that acquisition does not have to be contemporaneous with transmission).

[23 Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633-35 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 

[24] Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001). 

[25] See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1998). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (1998) (stored communication). 

[26] See U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a).

[27] See U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).

[28] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1451.

[29] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1452.

[30] See Bochan v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1235-36 (D. Nev. 1996). 

[31] Andersen Consulting L.L.P. v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 

[32] Id. at 1042.

[33] Peter Schnaitman, Comment, Building a Community Through Workplace E-Mail: The New Privacy Frontier, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 177, 177 nn.126-40 (1999).

[34] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1453.

[35] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1453 (citing cases using the context approach: United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974); James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979); and Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992)). 

[36] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1453.

[37] Id.

[38] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1453 n.85 (citing: Sanders v. Robert Bosch Co., 38 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 1994) and Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992)). 

[39] See Briggs v. Am. Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980) (employer can intercept business communications); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1983). 

[40] See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582-83 (11th Cir. 1983). 

[41] See Christopher P. Reynolds, Employment Litigation in the New Millennium - Technology Considerations, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, June 29, 1999, at n.28-29 (citing H. McNeil & R. Kort, Discovery of E-Mail: Electronic Mail and Other Computer Information Should Not Be Overlooked, The Or. St. B. Bull., Dec. 1995).

[42] See Blakely v. Cont'l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 549 (N.J. 2000). But see Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 96 Civ. 9747, at 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that objectionable e-mail alone is not sufficient to sustain a claim of a hostile work environment).

[43] See Wendy Leibowitz, As E-Mail Use Expands - Case Law Follows, N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1999, at 3.

[44] Allison R. Michael & Scott M. Lidman, Technology Advances Bring Increased Monitoring, EMP. L. STRATEGIST, Mar. 2001, at 2.

[45] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1457.

[46] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1457 (quoting Larry O. Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 345, 358 (1995)). 

[47] See Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

[48] Gandy, supra note 3, at 109.

[49] See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1998).

[50] See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (11th Cir. 1983). 

[51] See id. at 581.

[52] See Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 1992).

[53] See Bochan v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996). 

[54] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1460.

[55] FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).

[56] See Hall Adams, III et al., E-Mail Monitoring in the Workplace: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 67 DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 1, 2000, at 32 n.43-44. 

[57] See Christopher P. Reynolds, Employment Litigation in the New Millennium - Technology Considerations, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, June 29, 1999, pt.  

[58] Id.

[59] See H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. (1993); S 984, 103d Cong. (1993). 

[60] See H.R. 1900, 103d Cong. §§ 4(B), 5(B)(3), 7 (1993). 

[61] Jarrod J. White, E-Mail-Work.Com/Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1101 (1997). 

[62] Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 1465 (introducing proposals such as "reasonable" monitoring and necessity of showing "compelling business interest"). 

[63] Gandy, supra note 3, at 119.

[64] Id. at 119.

[65] Id. at 134.

[66] Id. at 135.