Author:	Kenneth Mwenda LLB, BCL, MBA, PhD, DBA, FCI, FRSA World Bank
Subjects:	Democracy - Africa Economic development - Africa (Other articles) Human rights - Africa
Issue:	Volume 7, Number 4 (December 2000)
Category:	Comment

Contents

• Introduction
• Benevolent and Enlightened Dictators
• Human Right Standards for Africa
• Preliminary insights into the discourse
• Misconceptions in the discourse and the deconstruction of such conjectures
• Weighing the concept of human rights against that of responsibilities in an African set-up
• Taking account of the modernisation trend in the Post-colonial African state
• Setting the law in context and some contextual analogies
• Conclusion
• Notes

Introduction

"Different historical contexts have generated different pre-occupations: different pre-occupations have generated different emphasis." [1]

Benevolent and Enlightened Dictators

1. That many parts of Africa, like parts of Asia and Latin America, are viewed by many as 'less happier lands', is a perception that leads one into inquiring about prospects of any serious development in Africa. This quagmire has generated a lot of literature from various scholars and schools of thought. In this paper, a fundamental departure is taken from most of the literature presently available on socio-economic and political development in Africa. As Professor Shimomura observes, in the case of East Asia:

   "The experience of East Asia seems to be worthy of careful study for two reasons. First, East Asian economies have achieved 'rapid and equitable growth', as several recent studies (including World Bank 199[3] illustrated. Second, these economies have adopted their own distinctive approaches of economic development, which are different, to a certain extent, from the model which has been advocated by the Western countries and international institutions." [2]

2. Wondering into some undisciplined thinking, and pondering over the political milieu abound in Africa - that is, including the abject levels of poverty and the endemic and systemic malaise of the public and private engines of socio-economic development - this paper is underscored by an analysis of the type of political leadership that could spur Africa to higher heights of economic growth and social development. The correlation in many African States between the economy and politics is recognised. An integrated view is provided on such correlation.

3. Closely related to the theme on political leadership is the notion of promoting human rights in Africa. Is the type of leadership that is being advocated for Africa one that could promote and protect the rights of people, or is it a dictatorship that would simply thrive on anarchy and arbitrariness? What are the lessons for Africa and what is the way forward? Professor Shimomura observes:

   "Without developmentalism...it would be highly difficult for a developing country to achieve take-off. In a later stage, after achieving a certain degree of economic development, ... there would be a good chance to realise democratisation, as citizens or private sector would begin to look for their political influence...economic development is pursued as the most important national goal; it should be emphasised that democracy also pursued in this stage is with lower priority. In the next stage, the success of economic development is expected to facilitate democratisation. Developmentalism regime appeared in Germany and Japan in their early stages of development. In both cases, the authoritarian systems were finally replaced by parliamentary democracy. East Asia has followed the same track."[3]

4. This paper argues that to overcome the structural and institutional constraints facing developmental challenges in Africa, the continent must lessen its ideological focus on a more liberal and laissez-faire market approach. In the stead of such an approach, a more structured system which promotes the idea of enlightened and benevolent 'dictators' must be adopted. But why should dictatorship be thought of as a way of overcoming the challenges to development? In Africa, the discourse of human rights, for example, has been misconstrued to an extent that both the State and private citizens tend to abandon their positions in regards to civil duties and moral obligations. Some superficial cynics will, however, readily warm up to this view and contend that human rights are human rights no matter where we are. But, such criticisms are less meaningful if not placed in context. Let us take the example of gay rights in Africa.

5. Ordinarily, such rights in Africa are a mere expression of norms that have very little to do with issues of bread and butter to the common man. By contrast, if we talk of fundamental and universal human rights, such as freedom from torture and slavery, or freedom of assembly and freedom of expression (though not necessarily dwelling on extreme interpretations of liberties such as the freedoms associated with the 'gay' movement), these rights assume the position of inalienable rights in any civilised society. [4]

6. It must be stressed, however, that, like the State, citizens have responsibilities towards helping their nation to develop. But, democracy, as espoused by the West, seems to be a difficult thing for Africans to grasp. In Africa's case, such notions of democracy translate into anarchy - a free for all situation - with an establishment of several weak and ambitious political parties engrossed in public squabbles. [5]

7. In such an environment there is hardly any social order, although there is a superficial view by many commentators that Africa is now embracing democracy. Maybe this democracy thing is not just for the Africans. But, Africa must find a democracy modelled on her own African values of self-esteem and social responsibility. These values extend to both the State and the individual. To get to this stage, Africa will have to recognise the role that enlightened and benevolent 'dictators' can play. Only such leaders can get rid of retrogressive elements that are masked as democracy. I call such leaders 'dictators' - though not according to the grammatical meaning of the term 'dictator'. Whereas ordinarily dictators are individuals that exercise despotic power, and hardly observe any constitutional restraints, 'enlightened and benevolent' dictators, on the other hand, are somewhat akin to the concept of Philosopher King, espoused by Plato in his famous treatise, The Republic. The main emphasis, however, in the case of enlightened and benevolent dictators, is that these individuals must possess the qualities of enlightenment, good leadership, and altruistic values that promote benevolence for the common good over any selfish individual needs. As Professor Shimomura observes:

   "Democracy is no doubt a global norm to be pursued. However, the relationship between democracy and economic development seems to be complicated and controversial. Democratisation, as well as good governance, is expected to contribute to economic development... At the same time, economic development is expected to promote democracy, as it creates a new driving force of democratisation, in particular a new middle class. It may be possible for us to envisage the virtuous circle between these two elements." [6]

8. Mindful of the fact that the West would call the concept of an enlightened and benevolent dictator a simple masquerade of 'despotic dictatorship', the ways of the West are not necessarily the ways of Africa. Indeed, those from the West who see only ignorance in what comes out of Africa, every time they look at Africa, are in effect seeing their very own ignorance. It is time Africa re-discovered her own sense of self-esteem in order to develop its inherent potentialities. Time is up for Africa to stop engaging in endless civil wars for which many Africanists blame the West as the perpetrators of such vices. Yet, Africa continues to run back to the West to beg for financial aid and loans as a subtle form of reparation for colonial sins committed by the West. To unwind from such contradictions, Africa needs to develop well structured and highly enlightened dictatorial systems of government. Whatever arguments may be advanced against this view, it remains factual that Africa has tried - wrongfully or rightly, it matters less - Western ethos of democracy and nothing has come out of it. It would be futile to attempt to pursue a red herring by arguing that first, the institutional and structural arrangements in Africa must be changed before democracy can work. What Africa needs is a system that is workable; a system that can work to bar forms of anarchy which are masked as democracy. This system must, however, preserve the dignity and well-being of mankind, while placing an emphasis on state and individual responsibilities. As Professor Shimomura argues:

   "Perhaps this is an ideal scenario. But is it realistic to assume that this virtuous circle can occur in the early stage of economic development in ordinary developing countries? When we review history, we learn that modern economic growth under the typical parliamentary democracy is found only in a very limited number of countries, such as the United States. From this historical lesson, an argument is drawn: under some circumstances, particularly in the early stage of economic development, there tend to be policy trade-offs between democracy and development. ...Yasusuke Murakami of Tokyo University stated that it is quite difficult for an economy to initiate transformation, such as industrialisation (the essence of modern economic growth), smoothly under parliamentary democracy, as the attempt to introduce fundamental changes is often blocked under parliamentary democracy by the groups with vested interest." [7]

9. Although the proposal for an enlightened and benevolent dictator may sound quite radical, one cannot help but admire great men like Shaka Zulu who surged forward on the basis of a disciplined army that did not tolerate laziness. Judged by the times when the Mfecane wars were fought, Shaka was an enlightened dictator who built a kingdom that amassed great wealth. But, I concede that times are now changing. Be that as it may, concepts such as Shaka's can be adapted and applied to contemporary African society. What is important here is to adapt such concepts to a different context and time. African systems of government must be tested against pragmatism, originality, versatility, adaptability and realism. Africa can only predict its future if she knows where she is coming from, notwithstanding any external forces, and if she is able to accept her present shortcomings politically and economically. Somewhere in between, and from what experience has taught Africa, Africans must find their own way forward.

   Human Right Standards for Africa

10. The African continent is now pregnant with a sense of hope from its peoples and sympathisers; some publicists and African scholars are propagating an African Renaissance for the new millennium. Yet, there is still a looming pessimism from some cynics, or is it pragmatists and rightists? Several studies have been undertaken on the disappointing record of human rights in Africa. While it is not the purpose of this paper to regurgitate the findings of such studies, or to celebrate a sense of euphoria in the way Africanity - from an African traditional society point of view - dealt with and maintained social order, this part of the paper attempts to place in context and deconstruct the ideologically biased mode of perceiving the concept of human rights in Africa. It is argued here that this bias is often perpetuated by a liberal and bourgeois school of thought in the field of human rights.

    Preliminary insights into the discourse

11. To counter bourgeois inclined conjectures and misconceptions on human rights in Africa, this part of the paper recognises not only the importance of promoting the rule of law, constitutionalism and such fundamental precepts of democracy as a good record of human rights. The paper also argues that in the case of less individualistic societies, such as African and Asian societies, the promotion of social and individual responsibilities - that is, for both the state and the individual - can help to bring about and maintain a desired social order. Such a social order may provide appropriate moral and ethical incentives which could, in turn, serve as preconditions for social development. The maintaining of social order in this manner requires a shift in the intellectual discourse from placing greater emphasis on individuals' rights to looking at responsibilities of both individuals and the state in the promotion of social development. It is acknowledged here that while a good record of human rights in any country not only serves as a hallmark of civility, but also speaks well of the level of social development in that country, the process and experience through which every society advances towards civility and social development is conditioned by different variables and concrete realities. Against this background, what, then, are human rights in Africa and to what extent are they interwoven with the socio-economic and cultural fabric of society?

    Misconceptions in the discourse and the deconstruction of such conjectures

12. Are human rights simply human rights wherever we go, to such an extent that it is not necessary to talk about human right in Africa as if they were different from human rights in Bosnia? When we ask such a question, can we - by that fact alone - be accused of missing the point and that we are misdirecting ourselves by thinking that human rights are a simple creation and child of the West? But does good reasoning not require us to view things in an appropriate context that sets the legal dimension to social development in its social, political and economic context? Public international law provides some useful insights here. Both customary and conventional international law recognises that norms falling under the doctrine of jus cogens, that is, norms from which no state can derogate, include aspects of universal human rights. [8] These norms, as discussed in the first part of this paper, include matters such as the freedom from slavery and genocide. [9] Universal rights are so fundamental to every society that many states now consider them as universally applicable in the world. [10]

13. Closely related to the above examples of jus cogens is the right to life. But could we, for example, say that claims about and for homosexual rights in the West are as applicable to Africa as they are in the West? It is such matters that require the critical distinction between various historical contexts of different societies. Are human rights and democracy in Africa to be defined as we are told from the West? To what extent is the notion of human rights free from ideological influences and value judgements of those who conjure these misconceptions? Let us take a more reasoned look at some of the contextual issues surrounding the concept of human rights in Africa.

    Weighing the concept of human rights against that of responsibilities in an African set-up

14. Every society is built on a set of values and norms. In the traditional African set-up, for example, a sense of duty and responsibilities, on individuals and their communities, was more paramount than the notion of human rights. [11] In these societies, there were no lobby groups such as the homosexual movement that we know today. People had other priorities to meet and these were probably more pressing and important. [12] Such priorities included meeting the basic physiological needs relating to food security, clothing and shelter. But that is not to say lobby groups such as the gender-equality movement should not operate in Africa. Women must be empowered at all costs. [13]

15. But the politics of empowerment must shift emphasis (in the case of Africa, for example, due to the cheap cost of hiring household labour and the presence of dependants in many African households) from 'kitchen' politics to more serious issues such as improving the role and participation of women in politics and major heights of a national economy. Also, laws protecting women from sexual harassment and retrogressive customary practices should be promoted. And all this is above 'kitchen' politics of who is going to cook dinner tonight, wash plates, or change the baby's nappies. As I have argued above, the intellectual discourse must shift from placing emphasis on individual rights to addressing responsibilities of individuals and the state. That is how social order was (and is) maintained in the most remote and primitive forms of rural and traditional African government. But, I agree that times are changing fast in the contemporary modern African society.

    Taking account of the modernisation trend in the Post-colonial African state

16. In Africa, we are now faced with a growing 'public' agitation for the state to respect the human rights of its citizens. As a result, anything anti-government today - be it for selfish ends or not (e.g. secessionist incidents that are disguised as a people's right to self-determination) - tends to ride on the wings of 'human rights'. A sudden proliferation of opportunists masquerading as human rights experts and activists has recently emerged. But a number of these opportunists are not in search of human rights. Among other things, their concern is with donor funds and the ideological re-focusing of the continent. Human rights in these parts of the world is, indeed, a lucrative business. But even with the emergence of all these opportunistic and pro-capitalist, laissez-faire tendencies in African society, the various sub-cultures of the traditional African set-up are not entirely obliterated. The change from the Old to the New, when viewed from a dialectical materialist angle, shows that there is often a carry over of some properties from the Old into the New. This explains, for example, the cultural dichotomy and the ambivalence of the post-colonial state in Africa: a silent struggle between values of the traditional African society and norms of modernity and Western civility. In this political milieu, however, we must find a new meaning to the concept of human rights in Africa.

17. The African society, as I contend, has largely, and historically, been built on the notion of duty, as opposed to rights. And the case of Africa is not unique in this sense. Other developing societies such as the Asian societies have had similar experiences. In general, rights, in contrast to duties, are aggressive and assertive. Duties, on the other hand, call for modesty and humility, yet at the same time realising the importance of coexistence. In many cases, rights are ego-centric and tend to be jettisoned by surrogate activists in pursuit of their own selfish ends at the expense of the common good. To this end, the pursuit of anarchy is often disguised as an act of human rights. But this view does not exonerate the state from the obligation to respect and uphold the rights of its citizens. Indeed, the view does not call for a conservative and reactionary culture. Rather, the thesis in this study pins down both the state and the individual in as far as civic responsibilities are concerned. Let us take an enlightening example of a young couple that is about to get married.

    Setting the law in context and some contextual analogies

18. In the West, it is not uncommon to see Hollywood celebrities enter into pre-nuptial agreements. They have their own good reasons for doing so. But, in an African sense generally, such agreements are hard to conceive of for they are an anti-thesis to the institution of marriage; that is, they are seen as militating against the very essence of marriage where man and woman are supposed to be one. Man and woman, in an African sense, enter into a marriage whose underlying obligations extend to and bind extended families on either side of the couple. Thus, there is an element of individual and social responsibilities generated by an African marriage. In the public's eye, the couple should live together for life without 'any immediate' contemplation or fears of divorce and how property would be shared or split thereafter. Against this view, it could be argued while the African marriage is dictated by a sense of community and social responsibility for a life long commitment, the Hollywood marriage is a disguised form of perpetuated individualism and limited permanency. This Western notion of individualism is then presented to society as a pre-nuptial marital arrangement. Co-operation in such a structure is often temporary because of lack of social cohesion. In the stead of such cohesion, human rights activism takes centre stage and we all know what happens thereafter because responsibilities are not taken as a virtue of maintaining social order.

19. Generally, the concept of duty requires an individual to place the common good before individual satisfaction. This is how the African society was modelled. Those that went against these norms were seen as outcasts and this explains why for a long time African communities farmed and harvested in groups. It was done for the common good of the extended family. The point being made here is not to revert to the old norms upon which the African society was based. Rather, the argument, which is a challenge to human rights scholars and activists who have advanced Euro-centric notions of human rights in Africa, is that we should deconstruct the Western myth of human rights and permit Africans to re-discover their ideal versions of democracy and human rights. In this respect, the dialectical law of negation of the negation calls us to re-visit the historical context within which human rights are conceived. [14]

20. The concept of duty, which is modelled after the old traditional African society, presents some difficulties because we are faced with many over-enlarged and oppressive African state bureaucracies. The concept of duty does not therefore capture the civic obligations of the African state, although it would work well with individual citizens. To overcome this weakness, Africa must move ahead and consider the notion of responsibility as a basis upon which social order should be constructed. The state owes social, political and economic responsibilities to its citizens and, in this respect, the rule of law must be observed and constitutional restraints placed on arbitrary powers of the state. [15]

21. Equally, the individual owes responsibilities towards the state to refrain from prejudicial acts or omissions such as subversive manoeuvres. Thus, the notion of responsibility is more attractive than that of duty because it is wider in scope and has its pedigree in the moral and ethical domains. By contrast, the notion of duty is rigidly sourced from the legal domain and for it to be effective it must be judicially enforceable and justiciable. Responsibilities, on the other hand, need not necessarily be judicially enforceable or justiciable. Responsibilities, generally, capture the very ethos upon which the common good of society is based. We know that often the state can show that it has no duties towards an individual's well being if that individual lets himself down. But at the same time, we know that there is an element of social responsibility for the state to provide social welfare for pensioners, and to provide education and many more for its citizens. [16]

22. Once we move away from the aggressive agenda of human rights, which is often confrontational against the state and places no major responsibilities on the individual, yet requiring the all-embracing and oppressive post-colonial African state to observe the rights of its citizens, we can avoid confrontational means to restoring social order. It is important to note that the state machinery of many post-colonial African states is visibly and notoriously oppressive. It is therefore not easy to subject such a powerfully coercive state system to the 'human rights' agenda. By contrast, it would serve strategically useful to place emphasis on an enforceable and well respected Bill of Responsibilities for both the State and the individual.

23. The traditional African society, whose value system is still notable in the contemporary modern African society, was not developed on capitalist laissez-faire values of aggression and individualism. The African society, evolving through different socio-economic epochs, has often shown greater tendencies towards communitarianism; with values and ethos of the common good embedded in social responsibilities of the state and the individual. It is, indeed, futile to attempt to view the concept of human rights in Africa in isolation from the level of development of the continent. Even from the perspective of historical materialism, it could be argued that the Western capitalist system as we know it today developed from a feudal system. But Africa has stagnated somewhere in between the feudal and capitalist systems. We cannot therefore impose a capitalist human rights superstructure on a continent that is not fully capitalist. Economically speaking, the material bases of most African societies have not even developed to levels that can sustain aggressive individualism. There is still a sense of collective and communal responsibilities in many parts of the African society. Therefore, the concept of human rights, which is deeply underscored by the philosophy of individualism, would not find the same attraction and support in such a community than the concept of responsibilities. But that is not to say there is nothing progressive in Western capitalist values. There are elements which are progressive in both the traditional African set-up and the Western capitalist system. What is important therefore is to identify and rationally stitch together into one fabric, and in a pragmatic way, such progressive-looking constitutional elements.

    Conclusion

24. In Africa, and in relation to commentators and publicists addressing the plight of Africa, we must marshal a paradigm shift in the way democracy and good governance are perceived. Societal norms should be permitted to deconstruct legal norms which thrive unconsciously on Western values of individualism and, also, those values that are archaic to African societal norms. Yes indeed, the polemics are simply in ideology. As a fable would show, a young African Masai boy of, say, 8 or 10 years, and growing up in his Masai land where boys are required customarily to herd cattle, would be surprised to learn that some Western countries are crying out aloud that Masai boys are being exploited by Masai farmers to look after the farmers' cattle. Worse even, the boy will not understand - not even after years of going to school and university - why the West has had to treat his cultural way of life as equivalent to 'abuse of child labour rights'. And given the nature of the hard hit economies in Africa, which often call on young boys to take up challenges and responsibilities that would ordinarily go to grown up men, the West will still be quick to judge the position of many young people in Africa as akin to abuse of children's rights. But, what with the low life expectancy in Africa, resulting from poor health and nutritional standards? The young ones, especially orphans, are often left to fend for themselves. The State is nowhere to be seen and it simply abdicates its responsibility to provide social safety nets to address the plight of these children. It is for this reason that I contend strongly that the polemics of human rights are simply in ideology. Indeed, can the West be justified in decreeing an embargo against Masai beef on the ground that the Masai boys are subjected to child labour exploitation in looking after their parents' animals?

25. I have watched with great curiosity the manner in which ideologically bankrupt slogans such as the right to development are sold to the African intellectual discourse on social development. Strenuous efforts are made to categories rights into the first, second and third generation categories of rights - just to bring on board the 'political' rhetoric propagating the right to development and the right to self-determination. Whereas I agree that there is a well established and recognised right to self-determination under international law, it is my view that there is no such thing as a right to development no matter how much we try to justify it under the second or third generation rights argument. A right, by its very nature, must be enforceable and must have a corresponding duty on the other party to respect that right. But, would someone tell me: what duty is there on developed countries to uphold or support the right to development of Third World countries? And would the latter countries enforce such a duty - if there was one, at all - before the International Court of Justice or any other international judicial organ? It is the view of this author that enlightened and benevolent dictatorships seem the only logical way forward, and the most likely efficient and effective means, for Africans to combat poverty at the earliest possible time and opportunity.